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Enforcement Challenges and Victories
In June 2017, CAPI presented the second installment of our signature
conference, Global Cities II, which brought together anti-corruption leaders
from government and civil society worldwide, including delegates from
Bogotá, Cape Town, London, Melbourne, Miami, Montréal, New York,
Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and San Francisco, to discuss important topics such as
using data analytics to combat corruption, government transparency,
enforcement challenges and victories, and innovations in oversight. Videos
and other materials from Global Cities II can be found here.
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This brief was prepared by the Center
for the Advancement of Public Integrity
at Columbia Law School. We can be
reached at CAPI@law.columbia.edu.
CAPI would like to thank Andrew
Kuntz, CAPI summer research intern
and Columbia Law School student, for
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Introduction
The Enforcement Challenges and Victories panel included Mary Cagle, Inspector General of Miami-Dade County,
Wilson Leung, former Assistant United States Attorney and currently the Global Ethics and Investigations Manager
at HP and Nick Maxwell, formerly with Transparency International UK and founder of NJM Advisory. Anita Das,
CAPI Research Fellow, moderated the panel. PowerPoint presentations and videos of the Enforcement Challenges
and Victories panel can be found here.
Enforcement Challenges: Mary Cagle, Inspector General of Miami-Dade County
Mary Cagle opened the panel with an assessment of three key challenges to enforcement work that her agency, the
Miami-Dade OIG, has faced. First, Cagle discussed maintaining independence without undermining efficiency. She
noted that her office had secured its independence in four ways: first, through the selection of the Inspector
General via an independent, statutorily required, process involving a panel of community leaders; second, through
empowerment to investigate anyone at any level of local government; third, by having relative budget security
through ordinance and fees imposed on most County contracts; and fourth, by the designation of OIG lawyers as
Assistant State Attorneys with the power to bring enforcement actions on behalf of the state.
Given that a watchdog agency may be tasked with investigating high level government officials, Cagle also
emphasized that is important to understand how best to strike a balance between having a good relationship with
the relevant administration while maintaining your distance. If the relationship is too acidic, then it may be more
difficult to work with an administration to implement important recommendations. By contrast, if the relationship
becomes too close, then there may be concerns, internally or externally, about the independence of investigations,
which may undermine a watchdog’s relationship with the community, whistleblowers, and other parts of the
government.
A second challenge Cagle identified was in making people aware of the OIG, and she discussed how to cultivate a
culture that is supportive of whistleblowing. Cagle’s office is required by statute to engage in outreach, and she
noted how responsive people tend to be when they learn about the OIG, particularly when the outreach is made
accessible through videos and other technology. A related part of the challenge is building a culture that supports
whistleblowing. Though acknowledging that this may not be appropriate in all situations, Cagle described MiamiDade’s “appreciation” model, which consists of favorably publicizing the act, sending the whistleblower a letter of
thanks, and attempting to cultivate a positive view of transparency and watchdog agencies.
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A third challenge to enforcement noted by Ms. Cagle involved taking context into account when engaging in
oversight and making recommendations. Different problems require different solutions that reflect the varying
structures, incentives, and perspective of the actors and agencies involved. Additional checks may not always resolve
the problem and can sometimes merely create additional chokepoints for corruption and more paperwork to sift
through for disclosures.
Enforcement Victories: Wilson Leung, Global Ethics and Investigations Manager, HP
Next to speak was Wilson Leung, former Assistant United States Attorney in San Francisco and currently the
Global Ethics and Investigations Manager at HP, who provided an overview of an enforcement victory secured by
the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California in the case of United States v. Leland Yee.
The case targeted Leland Yee, a prominent politician in San Francisco, who served as a member of the State
Assembly and State Senate in California. Though the case itself highlighted a successful investigation and
prosecution of corruption, Leung also noted that it demonstrated how corruption can take the form of both tragedy
and farce, and reminded the audience that investigations often lead to unexpected places. For Leland Yee, the
tragedy was that his pursuit of public office drove him into debt, which led to his participation in corrupt and
criminal conduct, including accepting money in exchange for using his influence as a public official. The farce was
that his actions, particularly his participation in a conspiracy to purchase and import firearms from the Philippines,
directly contradicted his strong public support of gun control.
The initial investigation, however, did not focus on Leland Yee, but instead involved a local underworld figure. In
the course of the investigation, threads from Leland Yee’s operation became visible. Yee ultimately pleaded guilty
to a racketeering conspiracy, and was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment.
Leung closed his overview by musing on the issue of corruption. Though every case is unique, practitioners may
recognize certain recurring questions and themes in the course of their anti-corruption work: What possesses
politicians to engage in corruption? Of the options open to them, why do public officials engage in certain crimes
instead of others? Why do politicians engage in behavior that appears to carry a high chance of getting caught? Do
certain political structures generate more corruption, such as one-party rule? Possibly the answers to some of these
questions would aid in not only corruption enforcement, but prevention as well.
Enforcement Developments
Nick Maxwell, formerly with Transparency International UK and currently the Principal of NJM Advisory,
examined enforcement challenges involving the flow of corrupt capital into high-end real estate in cities throughout
the world. Mr. Maxwell opened his discussion by identifying corrupt capital as a global vulnerability to public
integrity, and opined that enforcement to combat this issue is severely lacking. Maxwell posited that this is due to
the ease and desirability of laundering money through real estate. The ease comes from the ability to use offshore
companies and shell companies to avoid ever having to disclose the true owner of properties. The desirability comes
from real estate being a reliable way to store wealth generally, and a good way, more specifically speaking, to take
funds out of legal systems where they might be vulnerable to law enforcement. Corporate secrecy adds an additional
layer of complexity to these matters, because legitimate and illegitimate enterprises may engage in similar patterns of
activity, which make investigation and enforcement all the more challenging.
Though the existence of under-enforced public integrity issues is nothing new, the estimated scale of real estate
money laundering sets it apart. The United Nations believes that less than 1% of illicit wealth is even detected.
Transparency International has found that since 2004, over £180 million worth of property has been brought under
criminal investigation in the UK as the suspected proceeds of corruption.
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To assess this vulnerability, Maxwell described a study done to determine how much of London real estate was
owned by offshore companies. This effort made use of data analytics to evaluate personal and corporate holdings in
order to understand the risk factors for public integrity. The study was done in collaboration with law enforcement.
Of the properties held by foreign companies, 89% were held by companies incorporated in what are considered to
be “secret” jurisdictions, such as the British Virgin Isles. Such ownership may routinely be highly concentrated. For
example, in a certain bureau in London, almost one out of every ten buildings was owned by a foreign company that
was incorporated in a secret jurisdiction.
Maxwell noted that though anti-money laundering provisions should act as a safeguard against this type of activity,
real estate is not always subject to the type of transparency requirements that have been imposed on other industries
to address corruption. Further, asset recovery cases involving international corrupt capital being laundered through
property have been rare, and there have been few to no reports of criminal penalties against complicit real estate
agents. Though financial disincentives are in place in certain jurisdictions, they have proven ineffective given the
size of the real estate market and the fact that real estate is a commission-driven business: in most cases it is more
financially advantageous to simply sell the real estate and pay the fine than to never buy it in the first place.
Enforcement may improve, however, as this problem gains wider recognition. Maxwell believes that new tools, in
conjunction with public discontent, may drive the type of follow-up needed to overcome this challenge to public
integrity and ultimately to enforcement efforts.
Enforcement beyond the Panel: Challenges and Solutions
The panel presentation was followed by a break-out session, where conference delegates shared enforcement
experiences and built on the themes of the panel discussion. First, delegates identified a common challenge to
enforcement as the lack of direct enforcement power in the offices conducting these investigations. Separate
enforcement entities, such as prosecutor’s offices, routinely decline to take on corruption cases, sometimes because
of a lack of resources or a lack of familiarity with that area of law. One potential solution was identified in the
Miami-Dade OIG, which maintains a practice of having in-house lawyers designated as Assistant State Attorneys.
Though such a practice is dependent on the political realities of a given agency, it has allowed the Miami-Dade OIG
to avoid or minimize the difficulties associated with finding a prosecutor to take on its cases.
A second experience shared by delegates was that enforcement alone is not always effective in protecting against the
reemergence of corrupt practices. Intertwined with this was a discussion about balancing a harm-reduction model of
enforcement against a penalty and deterrence-based model. Each model relies on the goal of steering behavior and
relies on incentives to push or nudge behavior that effects the ultimate action, or inaction, of individuals involved.
As delegates noted, combating corruption needs to be more than just deterrence, and ideally would happen through
internal and institutional change which can be achieved through education programs (like outreach to agencies and
officials) and rewards, such as distributing integrity awards at public ceremonies, and sending out letters highlighting
desirable conduct.
Third, delegates discussed how measurement models may impact the evaluation of an office’s effectiveness. Though
successful prosecution is one common baseline, other models included the attempted evaluation of systemic
change, included determining whether recommended changes to an agency are adopted. This notion of trying to
accurately measure success raises the issue of whether successful outcomes in the short term might create new
avenues for corruption, as additional checks sometimes add opportunities for corruption. Finally, measuring success
can have other unexpected effects, when, for example, an office is deemed to have solved the corruption problem
(meaning the office is no longer necessary), or leaders may argue that greater “success” in terms of enforcement
actions brought by the anti-corruption agency means that corruption in government has actually increased.
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Delegates suggested that developing the means to become a revenue-generating agency, such as by billing other
governmental agencies for investigations or keeping revenue generated through an investigation, can be helpful in
pushing back against such arguments.
Handling the proposal of and implementation of recommendations was a particular point of interest for delegates
because it is a common tension point between anti-corruption agencies and other government entities, including
legislative and executive bodies. Delegates identified the fine line between overstepping your role vis a vis the
agency and effectively and firmly providing and facilitating implementation of recommendations, and counseled
caution in this area. The delegates also noted the importance of handling properly the issue of whether and how
widely to publicize the recommendations made in an enforcement action. Effective publicizing an action depends
on appropriate engagement with the media and communicating the right pieces of information.
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